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COMMENT
The Environmental Audit Privilege: Where Does Louisiana
Stand In the Federal v. State Showdown?'
The past two decades could be referred to as the era of environmental
regulations. Particularly in corporate America, acronyms like CAA, CWA,
CERCLA, RCRA, HSWA, and SARA have become all too standard shop-talk.
Corporations that once marched to the beat of their own drummers are now
marching under a pervasive and complex regulatory scheme that carries with it
severe penalties for non-compliance. Faced with the daunting volume of
environmental regulations, increased scrutiny by government agencies, and
potential liability for noncompliance, many corporations have voluntarily
instituted rigorous internal auditing programs.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines an "environmental
audit" as a "systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated
entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental
requirements."' Many companies have found such a systematic and comprehen-
sive evaluation of corporate operations to be an indispensable management tool.
While primarily used to evaluate a company's compliance with environmental
laws and regulations, audits serve a host of other functions.
An audit is often the best mechanism for companies to assess their internal
control systems, management practices, training programs, and wasteful activities.
An audit of workplace conditions may also help a corporation to assure labor
organizations and public interest groups concerned with worker safety that the
company has complied with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)2
and state labor standards.' Furthermore, audits may be needed for corporate
dealings with outside parties. For example, many lenders, concerned with their
own liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA),4 now require detailed information regarding a
company's compliance record so as to identify possible claims that may be
asserted against the company! Whatever the incentive to conduct these self-
evaluations, internal environmental audits are now commonplace in corporate
America.
Considering the value of audits and the frequency with which they are
conducted, one can hardly imagine that environmental audits have engendered
Copyright 1997, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Winner of the Louisiana State Bar Association Environmental Section's 1996 student essay
contest. Previously published in part in The Louisiana Environmental Lawyer Vol. 3. No. 2.
1. EPA Final Policy Statement on Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure,
Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).
2. 29 U.S.C.A. Ch. 15 (1994).
3. Stephen L. Kass and Jean M. McCarroll, Corporate Compliance Audits, 213 N.Y. L.J. 1
(1995).
4. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994).
5. Kass and McCarroll, supra note 3.
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a veritable war between some states and the federal government. The raging
controversy stems from two camps with diametrically opposed viewpoints. The
main issues are whether audit documents should be privileged, and whether a
company who self-reports environmental violations discovered through an audit
should be immune from civil and even criminal liability. On one side, many
public interest groups, regulatory and law enforcement agencies, and
environmentalists want access to what they consider vital public information.
This side vehemently opposes audit privilege and immunity legislation. On the
other side of the battlefield are regulated entities that not only want a guarantee
that the results of their environmental audits will be confidential, but also want
a promise of immunity for any violations uncovered.
Responding to the battle cry of the regulated community, nineteen states have
already enacted audit privilege legislation. 6 Other states will soon follow suit. The
federal government, on the other hand, has joined forces with those opposed to
audit privilege and immunity laws. A joint policy statement issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) is
6. The following chart is a list of those states that had enacted audit legislation as of December
23, 1996:
STATE LAW/BILL EFFECTIVE QUALIFIED
DATE PRIVILEGE
Act 350
Act 94-139
SB 1142
Pub. Act 88-0690
P.L. 16-1994, § 8
SB 76
HB 681
SB 728
Statute § I 15B.03
Law § 49-2-51
HB 275
SB 138
SB 912
H 3624
SB 24
HB 2473
§ 19-7-101
IB 1845
Act 26
7/28/95
6/1/94
7/1/95
1/24/95
7/1/95
7/1/95
7/15/95
3/18/96
6/1/95
7/1/95
7/1/96
3/13/97
11/4/93
6/4/96
7/1/96
5/23/95
3/20/95
7/1/95
7/1/95
QUALIFIED CIVIL
AND/OR CRIMNAL
IM1MUNITY
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Information in chart compiled by the law finn of Hale and Doff, LLP in Washington, D.C.
Arkansas
Colorado
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
New Hampshire
Ohio
Oregon
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Wyoming
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the federal solution to the audit quagmire.7 That policy consists of a series of
primarily economic incentives designed to encourage companies to perform
voluntary internal audits.
The current federal/state split creates a dilemma for states that want to
encourage voluntary environmental auditing but have not yet adopted their own
audit laws or regulations. Suchstates must eventually choose sides andjoin forces.
For Louisiana, the choice will likely be made in the 1997 regular legislative session.
At the close of the 1995 session, Louisiana was on the road toward adoption of a
statutory audit privilege. Now the legislature may decide to change its course in the
light of recent EPA threats directed at states with audit privilege and immunity
laws. In the opinion of this author, audit privileges and immunity legislation is
imminent; however, before adopting any measures, the Louisiana Legislature
should re-examine both sides of the debate.
I. THE DUAL NATURE OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT: THE SWORD AND THE
SHIELD
In February of 1996, head of EPA, Carol Browner, told a United States House
of Representatives Democratic environmental task force that recent spending cuts
had caused EPA inspections to go down forty percent since October 1995: "The
environmental cop is absolutely not on the beat.... We cannot ensure American
people their air is clean, their drinking water is safe, (or] the health of their children
is protected."8 The ideal solution to EPA's enforcement dilemma would be self-
policing by industry; however, many businesses, particularly small and medium-
sized ones, have balked at such an idea claiming they are faced with a Catch-22
situation. Without systematic and periodic environmental audits, companies
recognize that an undetected, minor environmental violation can easily bloom into
major liability for a facility. On the other hand, undertaking a voluntary self-
evaluation may be equally risky.
A. The Genesis of the Audit Privilege Movement
Coors Brewing and Weyerhaeuser Company know the risks associated with
internal voluntary audits. In fact, both companies have lived corporate America's
worst auditing nightmares. In 1992, Coors informed the Colorado Department of
Health that a routine "process-audit" had revealed its brewing process was
liberating more than 650 tons of volatile organic compounds [VOCs] into the
atmosphere annually.' Subsequent to its voluntary disclosure, Coors was hit with
7. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).
8. Scott Sooner, Demos Knock EPA Budget Cuts, The Advocate, Baton Rouge, La., Feb. 27,
1996, at 13A.
9. David Rubenstein, Organizations Fight for Confidenfiality of Self-Audits, Corporate Legal
Times. March 1995. at 1.
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a multi-count enforcement action by the Colorado Department of Health.'0 The
company was assessed over one million dollars in fines, plus an additional penalty
for the "economic" benefit Coors received through its noncompliance."
Weyerhaeuser Company's auditing story arose from incidents at its paper mill
in Aberdeen, Washington. In 1989, an anonymous whistleblower tipped off EPA
criminal investigators that an illegal midnight dumping had occurred at the mill.' 2
While this whistleblower had in fact witnessed a legitimate midnight deposit
arranged by Weyerhaeuser Company and the local wastewater management plant,
EPA officials began an investigation of the activities at the Aberdeen mill. 3 That
investigation eventually led EPA officials to obtain a search warrent for the mill. 4
Three internal audit reports were seized and used against Weyerhaeuser Company
in a subsequent criminal prosecution." The company pleaded guilty to five
misdemeanors and paid fines totalling more than halfa million dollars.'6
Opponents of audit privilege legislation offer different versions of these two
stories and claim that both cases reveal the true propulsion behind audit laws. In
his recently published article, "Dirty Secrets: The Corporation's Campaign to
Create an Environmental Audit Privilege," Christopher Bedford explains that many
companies like Coors and Weyerhaeuser Company want to protect the findings of
their internal audits because they have some "dirty secrets" to hide.'7 Colorado
Department of Health inspectors notified Coors over a three-year period that it was
emitting substantial VOC emissions for which the company did not have
permits.'" Coors failed to meet compliance deadlines ".... until 1991 when, as
part of an agreement with the state on permits for another facility, Coors was forced
to do an audit'of its emissions as the first step in getting permits and controlling
releases."' 9 According to Bedford's article, Weyerhaeuser Company had some
"secrets" of its own. From 1980 to 1989, the company's saw mill discharged red
paint washes, including oil and latex-based solvents, into a nearby river." During
that time, three internal audits identified the waste water discharge as a potential
hazardous waste and a water quality violation, yet no move was made to correct the
problem until Weyerhaeuser Company was "caught." 2'
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id. at 1.
14. Christopher Bedford, National Organizer for Communities Concerned about Corporations,
Dirty Secrets: The Corporation's Campaign to Create an Environmental Audit Privilege 10
(publication information on file with the Louisiana Law Review).
15. Id. at 10.
16. Id.
17. Bedford, supra note 14.
18. Id. at 9.
19. Taken from a letter to Colorado State Senator Claire Traylor from Patricia A. Nolan, MD,
Executive Director, Colorado Department of Health dated 9/23/93, cited in Bedford, supra note 14.
20. Bedford, supra note 14, at 101
21. Id.
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Whether Coors and Weyerhaeuser Company were punished too harshly for
undertaking a voluntary self-evaluation, or whether both companies were hiding
"dirty secrets," one can easily see why regulated entities fear that their audit reports
will find themselves in the hands of their opponents. Internal audits are hot items
in environmental lawsuits. To a plaintiffs' attorney, prosecutor, or regulatory
official filing suit against a regulated entity, an audit report can often be as good or
better than a smoking gun. Besides pinpointing violations of environmental laws
and regulations, audit documents often contain detailed commentary and subjective
analysis relative to what mistakes may have led to the violation, who is responsible,
and how the company should remedy the problem. Although existing evidentiary
privileges and doctrines might provide some protection, these privileges have
proven largely ineffective where audit documents are concerned.
B. Traditional Protections
Over the years, three specific legal doctrines have been employed to shield
audit reports from disclosure: the attorney-client privilege, the work product
doctrine, and the self-critical analysis privilege.
1. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is codified in article 506 of Louisiana's Rules of
Evidence,' and is well-entrenched in the federal common law. In order to
encourage full disclosure from clients to their lawyers, the attorney-client privilege
allows a client to prevent his attorney from disclosing any confidential communica-
tions made to the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.' While a
small number of companies have successfully invoked this privilege to protect
information ascertained through an environmental audit, more often than not the
privilege is far too limited to protect audit reports.
The primary obstacle in using the attorney client privilege to shield audit
documents is the fact that the communication at issue (the audit report) must be
made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Where a company can prove that
the primary purpose of an audit report is to secure an opinion of law from inside or
outside counsel, courts have held that the attorney-client privilege protects the
report from disclosure to third parties or governmental agencies. 4 Most of time,
however, a lawyer merely aids in the preparation of the audit report itself. In such
a case, the attorney client privilege will not apply.
In United States v. Chevron,' for example, EPA officials demanded
disclosure of Chevron's environmental review status reports. Those reports had
22. La. Code Evid. art. 506.
23. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 87 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
24. SeeOlen Properties v. Sheldahl, Inc., No. CV91-6446-WDK, 1994 WL 212135 (C.D. Calif.
April 12, 1994).
25. Civ. A. No. 88-6681, 1989 WL 121616 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1989).
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been prepared by three people, one of whom was the corporation's environmental
attorney. Chevron invoked the attorney-client privilege; however, the court held
that the privilege did not apply since the mere presence of an attorney does not
make a communication privileged. Rather, the court said, a communication must
be made between a client and an attorney in his capacity as attorney, not merely
as a business advisor. In addition, the court noted that the lawyer must be
engaged in a legal inquiry as opposed to routine fact-finding, and the communi-
cation's main purpose must be to provide legal aid. As Chevron reveals, the
attorney-client privilege simply will not protect the vast majority of voluntary
environmental audits.
2. The Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine overlaps to some degree with the attorney-client
privilege. Like the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine does not
go far enough to protect most environmental reports from disclosure. Codified
in rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and article 1424 of
Louisiana's Code of Civil Procedure, the doctrine provides absolute protection
for an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories prepared
in anticipation of litigation.26 The doctrine also protects any other writing
prepared in anticipation of litigation, unless the opposing attorney proves that
unfair prejudice will result if he is denied access to those materials. 27
While litigation need not be imminent for the work product doctrine to
apply, documents must be prepared with at least "an eye toward litigation.""
While some audits are conducted as a result of pending litigation, most
companies perform audits as a part of their normal business operations.2 Most
routine audits, therefore, will not be covered by this evidentiary privilege."
3. The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege
The self-critical analysis privilege, also known as the self-evaluative
privilege, is a qualified privilege that protects from discovery certain self-
appraisals. which could. be used. against a company. in future. litigation."'
First used in the medical and securities fields to encourage internal investiga-
tions, courts have been reluctant to expand this privilege to environmental
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)X3); La. Code Civ. P. art. 1424.
27. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(bX3).
28. In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
29. Lynn L. Bergeson and Courtney B. Sandifer, EPA Ponders Its Environmental Policy While
Sttes and the Judiciary Move Ahead, 9 Toxics L. Rep. 769 (1994).
30. Id.
31. Joseph E. Murphy and Hlise L. Feitshans, Protecting the Compliance Audit, 943 PLI/Corp
667, 674 (1996).
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audits." A recent federal court decision, however, may offer regulated entities
some hope for protecting their audit documents.
In Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc.," a federal district court in
Florida held that certain documents in an environmental audit were protected
from discovery by the self-critical analysis privilege. The court determined that
the privilege, which is analogous to Federal Rule of Evidence 407 (dealing with
subsequent remedial measures), means that "an entity's retrospective self-
assessment of its compliance with environmental regulations should be privileged
in appropriate cases."' One important qualification of this privilege, the court
noted, is that the privilege may be overcome if an adverse party "can demon-
strate extraordinary circumstances or special need."3
Other courts have indicated a willingness to recognize the self-evaluative
privilege but have suggested that it only applies to private litigation.36 In
Federal Trade Commission v. TRW, Inc.,37 for example, a federal district court
held: "Whatever may be the status of the 'self-evaluative' privilege in the
context of private litigation, courts with apparent uniformity have refused its
application, where, as here, the documents in question have been sought by a
governmental agency.!"3
C. An Audit Privilege: Unnecessary Protection or Needed Incentive?
Against this backdrop of unreliable evidentiary protection, industry groups
began a movement on the federal and state levels to create a statutory privilege
for audit reports." In 1993, Oregon became the first state to pass an audit
privilege law.' ° Colorado soon followed suit with a similar law, though adding
a safe harbor provision that offers companies limited immunity from civil and
criminal liability.4 Since that time, nineteen other states have enacted privilege
legislation based on one of those two models, and many more are considering
similar measures.2
32. Paula C. Murray, The Environmental Self-Audit Privilege: Growing Movement In the States
Nixed by EPA, 24 Real Est. L.J. 169 (1995).
33. 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
34. Id. at 526.
35. Id. at 528.
36. See, e.g.. Reich v. Hercules, 857 F. Supp. 367-71 (D. N.J. 1994); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 861 F. Supp. 386, 387-89 (D. Md. 1994). This idea is discussed at greater length in
Mia Anna Mazza, T7he New Evidentiary Privilege for Environmental Audit Reports: Making the
Worst of a Bad Situation, 23 Ecology L.Q. 79 (1996).
37. 628 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
38. Id. at 211.
39. These groups include the Compliance Management and Policy Group (CMPG), the
Coalition for Improved Environmental Audits (CIEA), and the Corporate Environmental Enforcement
Counsel (CEEC).
40. Or. Rev. Stat. § 36-468.963 (1995).
41. Colo. Rev. Slat. Ann. § 13-25-1-114.5 (1994).
42. For a chart of states with audit privilege laws, see supra note 6.
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The basic concept behind an audit privilege is to make a company's
voluntary audit reports confidential, thereby protecting such information from
disclosure to enforcement officials and discovery in court actions. Without such
protection, some companies flatly refuse to conduct internal audits facing a fate
similar to Coors and Weyerhaeuser Company. Those companies that do conduct
compliance audits often couch their audit reports in "overly cautious lawyer-
speak" so that lawyers and prosecutors will not be able to use them as a road
map in court.43 A statutory audit privilege, say supporters, removes the
disincentive for companies to self-police and promotes frank and candid
discussion among those protected."
Many opponents of the privilege movement maintain, however, that a
statutory audit privilege will do little to improve the quality of audits or to
increase the frequency with which they are conducted. One very vocal opponent,
Bennet L. Heart, points to a recent Price Waterhouse survey 5 on voluntary
audits as proof that most of the country's large companies are already
conducting audits, even without the protection of an audit privilege; moreover,
fear of disclosure is rarely the pivotal factor when a company decides not to
audit."
In its survey, Price Waterhouse sent questionnaires to 1,800 manufacturing
companies in fourteen industrial sectors."7 Each company had over $10 million
in annual sales and over one hundred employees. Three hundred and sixty-nine
companies responded. Of those participating in the survey, seventy-five percent
currently perform some form of environmental auditing. Of the non-auditing
companies, only twenty percent (eighteen of ninety-one) identified "concern that
audit information could somehow be used against the company" as a factor
influencing their decision not to audit.'" The most frequently chosen reason for
not conducting audits was that companies "do not believe the need exists."'
Though smaller companies were not included in the survey, Heart attributes any
failure to audit on their part to limited resources and lack of information about
the benefits of environmental auditing, as opposed to fear of disclosure and
enforcement actions.s" Heart fails to mention, however, that among the self-
auditing companies in the survey, two-thirds said they would expand their
auditing programs if penalties were eliminated."1
43. Rubenstein, supra note 9, at 2.
44. Donald F. Berschback, Environmental Audit Privilege Laws: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come, 10 Toxics L. Rep. 976 (1996).
45. Price Waterhouse Voluntary Environmental Audit Survey of U.S. Businesses (March 1995).
46. Bennet L. Heart, The Environmental Audit Privilege: A Step in the Wrong Direction, 10
Toxics L. Rep. 306 (1995).
47. Id., Price Waterhouse Voluntary Environmental Survey of U.S. Businesses.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Price Waterhouse Voluntary Environmental Audit Survey of U.S. Businesses (March 1995).
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II. REACTON ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL: EPA's PosIToN
Like Bennet L. Heart, EPA has taken the position that auditing practices are
expanding "without the stimulus of a privilege."5'2 EPA's internal review of the
Weyerhaeuser case provides some insight into its position on environmental
audits, as well as its traditional hostility to audit privileges. Commenting on
Weyerhaeuser, an EPA official said:
Environmental programs are self-reporting programs which assume that
all companies will act in good faith to comply. Such programs are
effective only if there is effective enforcement.... The audit is not a
means unto itself. It is one means of ensuring compliance and therefore
prosecution. The issue is really whether a company is willing to
commit immediately to addressing any problems raised in an audit."
Many EPA officials fear an audit privilege would "sanitize a wide range of past
violations under circumstances in which enforcement officials will find it difficult
to prove a corporation's improper intent."" Others say that an environmental
audit deserves no more special status than a corporation's financial records." In
Ohio, a deputy regional counsel for EPA even went so far as to call Ohio's
proposed environmental audit bill the "Polluters Protection Act." He said "the
U.S. EPA does not support an audit privilege because the proposed environmental
audit privilege promotes secrecy by allowing companies to withhold important
evidence from law enforcement agencies and the local public.""
Prompted by industry pressure and the growing movement in the states to enact
audit privilege legislation, the EPA issued an interim policy statement on March 31,
1995 specifically rejecting an across-the-board privilege for audit findings.58 The
EPA stated that such a privilege would serve to benefit lawbreakers, thwart open
participation in environmental policy and decision making, and clog courtrooms
with litigation over the specific parameters of the privilege. To promote voluntary
audits and reward companies that undertake them, EPA proposed instead to reduce
civil penalties or violations discovered through a self-audit, disclosed to the
appropriate agencies, and promptly corrected.59 Other provisions of the policy
provided for possible elimination of punitive damages and limitation of referrals to
52. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,709 (1995) (Explanation of Policy F. 2).
53. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency internal review of Weyerhaeuser case, cited in
Bedford, supra note 14, at 10.
54. Kass and McCarroll, supra note 3, at col. 1.
55. Id. at col. 1.
56. Reported in Corporate Communications at Browning Ferris Industries, Feb. 9, 1996 (on file
with the Louisiana Law Review).
57. Id.
58. 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875 (1995).
59. Id.
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the Department of Justice (DOJ); however, such blessings were reserved only for
those entities that could meet each of a long list of provisos.10
Most notable in the interim policy was a threat directed at the states consider-
ing audit privilege legislation and those states that had already adopted such
statutes.' EPA stated in no uncertain terms that it would step up enforcement in
states with audit privilege laws. Additionally, EPA administrator Carol Browner
told the National Association of Attorneys General in late March of 1995 that some
state audit legislation would override federal environmental regulations and
standards, causing environmental programs delegated to the states to revert to
national control.'
Through the end of May 1995, EPA took comments on the interim policy from
the Department of Justice, state attorneys general, local prosecutors, state
environmental agencies, the regulated community, and public interest organiza-
tions. After much debate and discussion, the interim policy was re-worked and
fine-tuned, and on December 22, 1995, EPA issued its final policy statement on the
voluntary discovery, disclosure, and remediation of environmental violations.63
Reaffirming its absolute opposition to statutory evidentiary privileges for audit
reports, EPA used the results of the 1995 Price Waterhouse survey on environmen-
tal auditing to identify non-statutory incentives that would encourage companies to
expand their auditing programs." A statutory privilege, says EPA, would not
reflect "the high value the public places on fair access to the facts" and would invite
secrecy.' EPA's greatest fear is that a privilege would prompt defendants to
claim as audit material "almost any evidence the government needed to establish
a violation or determine who was responsible."
A. Major Incentives Offered By EPA 's Final Policy Statement
In its final policy statement, EPA recognized the need to reward companies
that conduct voluntary audits. It identified three specific incentives to encourage
self-policing, self-disclosure and self-correction: (1) reduction of penalties; (2)
limitation of criminal referrals; and (3) the need for independent grounds for
instituting an enforcement inspection.
1. Reduction of Penalties
The main incentive, and the core of the new audit policy, provides for
elimination or substantial reduction of gravity-based penalties for violations
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 10 Toxics L. Rep. 1176 (1995).
63. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).
64. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,710 (1995) (Explanation of Policy F. 5).
65. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,709 (1995) (Explanation of Policy F. 1).
66. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,709 (1995) (Explanation of Policy F. 3).
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promptly disclosed and corrected.6" The gravity-based portion of a penalty,
which reflects the seriousness of a violator's behavior, represents that portion of
the penalty that is over and above any economic gain resulting from noncompli-
ance." For complete waiver of gravity-based penalties, a violation must be
discovered through an environmental audit or a compliance management system
that meets EPA's requirement of due diligence; however, even if a company did
not conduct an audit and cannot document due diligence, EPA will still reduce
gravity-based penalties by seventy-five percent for a violation that is "voluntarily
discovered, promptly disclosed and expeditiously corrected.""
2. Limitation of Criminal Referrals
EPA's policy also states that the agency will not recommend criminal
prosecution for a regulated entity that discovers violations through an audit or
due diligence, provided the company promptly discloses and corrects the
violations." Only good actors can benefit from this incentive. Noteworthy is
EPA's express stipulation that it "reserves the right to recommend prosecution
for the criminal acts of individual managers or employees under existing policies
guiding the exercise of enforcement discretion."'"
3. Need for Independent Grounds for Instituting an Enforcement
Inspection
Finally, the policy reaffirms EPA's practice, effective since 1986, of not
requesting audits to trigger an enforcement proceeding." Only when the
Agency has some independent reason to believe a violation has occurred will it
seek information relative to the infraction."
3
B. Conditions a Regulated Entity Must Meet
Before EPA will completely waive gravity-based penalties, a regulated entity
must meet nine specific conditions." For a seventy-five percent reduction of
gravity-based penalties, the entity must meet the last eight of these nine." The
conditions are:
67. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711 (1995).
68. EPA Environmental Self-Policing Policy. Client Alert (Latham & Watkins Environmental
Law Group) Jan. 19, 1996, at 2 (on file with Louisiana Law Review).
69. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66.707 (1995).
70. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711 (1995).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,708 (1995).
74. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711-66,712 (1995).
75. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711 (1995).
103919971
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(1) The violation is found through a systematic, objective and periodic
audit, or a documented, systematic compliance management program that
reflects the entity's due diligence in preventing, detecting and correcting
violations.
(2) The violation is voluntarily discovered, meaning it was not identified
through some procedure required by a statute, regulation, or order.
(3) The regulated entity discloses the specific violation within ten days
after discovery, or such shorter time as provided by law.
(4) The violation is identified and disclosed prior to commencement of
a governmental inspection or information request, notice of a citizen suit
or third party complaint, a reporting by a whistleblower employee, or
imminent discovery of the violation by a regulatory agency.
(5) The regulated entity corrects the violation within sixty days and takes
appropriate measures to remedy any environmental or human harm.
(6) The entity agrees in writing to take preventive measures to prevent
reoccurrence.
(7) The same or similar violation has not occurred at the facility within
the previous three years and is not a part of a pattern of violations over the
past five years.
(8) The violation cannot be one that results in serious actual harm,
presents imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment or
human health, or violates the specific terms of any judicial or adminis-
trative order or consent agreement.
(9) The entity must agree to cooperate with EPA and provide information
necessary to determine the applicability of this policy.76
In addition to these nine conditions, a regulated entity must satisfy two
additional conditions before EPA will avoid recommending that criminal charges
be brought against an entity. Specifically, the violation that is discovered must not
involve:
(1) any management practice or philosophy that concealed or condoned
the environmental violation; or
(2) any high level official's conscious participation or willful blindness
to the violation."
C. Does EPA's Final Policy Go Far Enough?
While some in corporate America may view EPA's final policy as a step in
the right direction, a regulated entity can hardly feel more secure conducting an
internal environmental audit today than it did prior to the time the final policy
76. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711-66,712 (1995).
77. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711 (1995).
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became effective. One need only examine the overwhelming amount of
discretion EPA has reserved to itself in its final policy to realize that companies
cannot safeguard the confidentiality of their audit reports, nor can they be
assured of significant immunity from criminal and civil liability. At frequent
intervals in the final policy, certain chilling reservations cut through EPA's
encouraging message to entities. What EPA giveth, it seems EPA also taketh
away.
Unquestionably, those companies that self-report environmental violations
to EPA can expect either complete waiver or a sizable reduction of gravity-based
penalties; however, EPA pointedly adds in Section (E) of the policy: "EPA will
retain its full discretion to recover any economic benefit gained as a result of
noncompliance to preserve a 'level playing field' in which violators do not gain
a competitive advantage over regulated entities that do comply. 78 Considering
that no one knows exactly how EPA will calculate the economic benefits of
noncompliance," one can imagine many scenarios where "leveling the playing
field" through economic penalties could be far more costly than pure gravity-
based penalties. For a policy intended to be grounded in financial incentives,
many companies simply will not think EPA's policy goes far enough.
Also antithetical to EPA's desire to give meaningful incentives to regulated
entities is EPA's firm statement that: "Whether or not EPA refers the regulated
entity for criminal prosecution. . ., the Agency reserves the right to recommend
prosecution for the criminal acts of individual managers or employees. .... "
This provision alone has the potential to significantly retard the number of self-
reported environmental violations. A company must self-police and self-report
to.be eligible for any of EPA's incentives; however, it goes without saying that
individuals, and not the company itself, will perform these functions. As one
commentator has noted, "it is doubtful someone would report a violation that
might protect the company but spell potential criminal prosecution for the person
making the report."'"
Another quite significant reservation of authority is EPA's ability to obtain
audit reports at its whim. While the. Agency states that it will not routinely
request the results of a voluntary audit, the very next sentence of the policy adds:
"If the Agency has independent reason to believe that a violation has occurred,
however, EPA may seek any information relevant to identifying violations or
determining liability or extent of harm."' One champion of audit privilege
legislation recently commented that this provision really means "[o]nce we [EPA]
get ahold of damaging information from a disgruntled employee, environmental-
ist, etc., we'll use that audit for prosecution faster than you can say 'plea
78. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,712 (1995).
79. Berschback, supra note 44, at 979-80.
80. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711 (1995).
81. Berschback, supra note 44, at 979.
82. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711 (1995).
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bargain."' In its explanation to this section, EPA notes that the agency has
not instituted a single criminal prosecution for violations discovered as a result
of a self-disclosed audit;" however, EPA does not say that such a criminal
prosecution is out of the question. Additionally, even though the Department of
Justice worked in close conjunction with EPA in developing the final policy, the
Justice Department still retains complete independent authority to prosecute any
environmental crimes.u
EPA's most far-reaching reservation of authority is found in Section (F) of
the final policy. That section states in part, "[t]he Agency [EPA] reserves its
right to take necessary actions to protect public health or the environment by
enforcing against any violations of federal law."" How can a regulated entity
be encouraged to voluntarily discover, disclose and correct an environmental
violation after a provision such as this? With one stroke of the brush, EPA has
potentially reduced every incentive in its policy to a string of promises full of
sound and fury, and perhaps, signifying nothing.
Beyond express reservations, certain broadly-worded provisions of the final
policy leave EPA with even further discretion to decide who will and who will
not receive EPA's protections. The Agency states, for example, that a violation
must be discovered through a procedure exhibiting to EPA that the entity used
"due diligence";"' however, the definition of due diligence is neither simple nor
clear. Reading the extensive laundry list of what constitutes due diligence,"
83. Berschback, supra note 44, at 979.
84. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,708 (1995).
85. Berschback, supra note 44, at 979.
86. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,712 (1993).
87. 60 Fed. Rg. 66,706, 66,711 (1995).
88. "Due Diligence" encompasses the regulated entity's systematic efforts, appropriate to the
size and nature of its business, to prevent, detect and correct violations through all of the following:
(a) Compliance policies, standards and procedures that identify how employees and
agents are to meet the requirements of laws, regulations, permits and other sources of
authority for environmental requirements;
(b) Assignment of overall responsibility for overseeing compliance with policies.
standards, and procedures, and assignment of specific responsibility for assuring
compliance at each facility or operation;
(c) Mechanisms for systematically assuring that compliance policies, standards and
procedures are being carried out, including monitoring and auditing systems reasonably
designed to detect and correct violations, periodic evaluation of the overall performance
of the compliance management system, and a means for employees or agents to report
violations of environmental requirements without fear of retaliation;
(d) Efforts to communicate effectively the regulated entity's standards and procedures to
all employees and other agents;
(e) Appropriate incentives to managers and employees to perform in accordance with the
compliance policies, standards and procedures, including consistent enforcement through
appropriate disciplinary mechanisms; and
(f) Procedures for the prompt and appropriate correction of any violations, and any
necessary modifications to the regulated entity's program to prevent future violations.
60 Fed. Reg. 66, 706, 66, 710() (1995).
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one realizes that companies may easily fall outside the parameters of EPA's
policy despite having a comprehensive and systematic auditing program in place.
EPA states that the criteria for due diligence is flexible and will accommo-
date companies of various types and sizes; however, EPA provides no guidance
on how the criteria will be applied in particular circumstances."' Additionally,
many companies that can document due diligence may still lose the protections
of the policy because the policy only applies to violations "identified voluntari-
ly." O Because "identified voluntarily" does not include any monitoring that is
already "prescribed by statute, regulation, permit, judicial or administrative order,
or consent agreement,' industry will undoubtedly complain that this is a case
where the exceptions swallow the rule.
Finally, companies will note that EPA's final policy is nonbinding. Section
(G) on the applicability of the policy states: "This policy sets forth factors for
consideration that will guide the Agency in the exercise of its prosecutorial
discretion.... The policy is not final agency action, and is intended as
guidance. It does not create any rights, duties, obligations, or defenses,
implied or otherwise, in any third parties."' 2 In light of this express provision,
EPA's comment in the summary to the policy that the final policy "will be
applied uniformly by the Agency's enforcement programs " 3 seems to have
little force.
III. LOUISIANA'S RESPONSE TO THE AUDIT PRIVILEGE
Louisiana did not see audit privilege legislation until the 1995 legislative
session. At that time, Representative John Siracusa introduced House Bill No.
2085 (H.B. 2085) for the purpose of creating an environmental self-audit
privilege and corresponding immunity from civil penalties. Mid-Continent Oil
and Gas Association, a powerful Louisiana lobby, drafted the original bill."
Later, in committee, the original bill was merged with a similar audit bill the
Louisiana Chemical Association had drafted.
The final version of H.B. 2085, as presented to the Louisiana legislature in
1995, was essentially a combination of Colorado's and Illinois' audit laws, as
well as a model bill put out by the Corporate Environmental Enforcement
Council [CEEC] and the Coalition for Improved Environmental Audits
[CIEA]. 9' The bill provided for civil immunity, privileges, release of informa-
tion, exceptions, and protection against disclosure. The stated purpose of H.B.
89. See Client Alert, supra note 68.
90. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711 (1995).
91. Id.
92. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,712 (1995) (emphasis added).
93. 60 Fed. Reg. 66.706 (1995).
94. Bedford, supra note 14, at 6.
95. Id.
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2085 was to encourage voluntary compliance and improve environmental quality
while preserving the regulatory authority of governmental agencies."
On May 17, 1995, the Louisiana House of Representatives passed the
amended bill by a vote of eighty-six to sixteen, with two members absent. When
Senator Mike Foster (now Governor Foster) subsequently introduced the bill in
the Senate Judiciary Committee, environmentalists sounded the alarm. Furiously
claiming that the bill had been routed through improper channels to avoid public
attention and to achieve speedy passage, Louisiana environmental advocates and
trial lawyers called an emergency press conference June 14, 1995."7 Through
the efforts of these groups, the Louisiana Senate tabled H.B. 2085, where it
remained at the close of the 1995 session."
Considering the overwhelming industry support for H.B. 2085 and the large
margin by which it passed out of the House of Representatives, that bill, or some
version of it, will likely resurface in the next regular legislative session in April
of 1997. If it does reemerge, the Louisiana legislature must decide whether H.B.
2085 should be modified to comply with EPA's final policy guidelines, or
whether-the bill, which offers both privilege and immunity features expressly
disapproved by EPA, should be pushed for passage in essentially the same form
as in 1995. An examination of the provisions of H.B. 2085 and a comparison
with EPA's final policy will be helpful in predicting the future of a statutory
audit privilege in this state.
A. Privilege For Voluntary Self-Evaluations
H.B. 2085 provided for a privilege for environmental audit reports prepared
pursuant to a plan pre-approved by management." In any noncriminal legal
action or administrative proceeding where the person or entity claiming the
privilege is a defendant, respondent, or applicant, the privilege would make the
audit report, or portions thereof, inadmissible."® Additionally, the contents of
the audit would not be subject to discovery,' and anyone involved in the
preparation of the audit could not be compelled to testify regarding any
privileged portions of the report."'
B. The Exceptions to the Privilege
As with almost every audit law or bill across the country, the seemingly
broad audit privilege in H.B. 2085 was purposefully riddled with exceptions to
96. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2511.
97. Bedford, supra note 14, at 6.
98. Id. at7.
99. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2512(7).
100. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513(A).
101. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513(A).
102. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2516(A).
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ensure that the privilege would not be abused. Specifically, Section 2514 of
H.B. 2085 stated that the self-evaluation privilege would not apply to any of the
following:
(1) Information or documents required to be developed, maintained, or
reported pursuant to a permit or order;
(2) Information or documents required to be available or furnished to
a regulatory agency pursuant to an environmental rule or law;
(3) Information obtained by a regulatory agency through observation,
sampling or monitoring;
(4) Information obtained through an independent source, even though
the subject of such information is in the audit report;
(5) Any records existing before the commencement of and/or indepen-
dent of the voluntary self-evaluation;
(6) Documents prepared subsequent to the completion of and indepen-
dent of the voluntary self-evaluation;
(7) Facts in an audit report disclosed in testimony by a person who
conducts or participates in the preparation of the report and who has
actually observed or has knowledge of physical events;
(8) The existence of an environmental audit report, the date of the
report, the period of time covered, the subject matter, and the names of
the consultants or personnel who conducted the report. °
3
In addition to excluding the above information from the reach of the
privilege, Section 2513 of the bill states that the privilege will not apply where:
(1) The privilege has been waived by concurrence of the owner or
operator of the audited facility or activity;
(2) A court or administrative law judge [ALJ] determines the audit report
shows noncompliance and appropriate efforts to achieve compliance were
not initiated within thirty days;
(3) A court or AL) determines the privilege is being asserted for
fraudulent purpose;
(4) A court or ALU determines the report was prepared to avoid disclosure
of information in a pending or imminent investigative, administrative, or
judicial proceeding, or to avoid disclosure in a civil proceeding for
property damage or personal injury; or
(5) A court or ALJ determines that the information contained in the report
demonstrates a significant danger to public health or the environment."
Section 2513 further provided that a party having independent knowledge leading
him to believe that an exception exists or that the privilege does not apply may
103. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2514.
104. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513.
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be granted access to all or part of the audit for the purposes of an in camera re-
view. °
While these exceptions to H.B. 2085 undeniably reined in the scope of the
audit privilege, companies would still be more inclined to self-police and self-
report under H.B. 2085 than under EPA's final policy where a privilege is not
even an option.
C. Civil Penalty Immunity
Besides creating an evidentiary privilege for audit reports, H.B. 2085 offered
another incentive to regulated entities in Louisiana. Section 2517 of the bill
provided for a rebuttable presumption that any person or entity who voluntarily
disclosed a violation of state environmental law or regulation would be immune
from any administrative or civil penalties.'" Like the evidentiary privilege,
this immunity was limited by express exceptions in the bill.
First, unless the facility conducting the audit notified the appropriate state
regulatory agency prior to conducting the audit, a person or entity who later
voluntarily disclosed would not receive immunity."0 Second, if disclosure
related to the person or entity's failure to satisfy a reporting requirement under
a specific permit condition or order, immunity would be lost.'" Third,
penalties could be imposed if: (a) the disclosure was not voluntary; (b) the
violation was committed intentionally or willfully by the person disclosing; (c)
the violation was not promptly corrected; (d) the violation caused a sighificant
danger to public health or the environment; or (e) the department knew of the
violation before the person disclosed it.'" Further, immunity would not apply
if a court or ALJ found the person or entity had committed "serious violations
that constitute a pattern of continuous or repeated violations of environmental
laws," and "were due to separate and distinct events giving rise to the violations"
within the three years before disclosure."0
While the privilege created by H.B. 2085 would be a radical departure from
EPA's final policy incentives, the exceptions to H.B. 2085's immunity provisions
would actually be in keeping with EPA's own limited penalty immunity. An
entity who self-reported an environmental violation under H.B. 2085 would by
no means be wrapped in an impenetrable cloak and freed of all liability. Rather,
that entity would only be relieved of paying "administrative or civil penal-
ties.""' EPA's final policy providing for the elimination or seventy-five
percent reduction of gravity-based penalties is not significantly different. While
105. Id.
106. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2517(A).
107. H.B. No. 2085. 1995 Session, § 2517(l).
108. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2517(D).
109. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2517(F).
110. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2517(G).
11. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2517 (emphasis added).
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EPA's criteria for reduction of penalties is undoubtedly more stringent than the
criteria under H.B. 2085, both measures intend to achieve higher levels of self-
policing, self-disclosure and self-correction through very similar financial
incentives. Most importantly, both measures confine these incentives to civil and
administrative proceedings.
D. Broad Terms In H.B. 2083 Give Entities More Flexibility
An examination of terms used in H.B. 2085 and similar terms used in EPA's
final policy reveals some of the underlying tension between the two measures.
For example, Section (DXI) of EPA's final policy states that a company is not
eligible for penalty elimination or reduction unless a violation is discovered
through either: (a) a "systematic, objective, and periodic" review of facility
operations related to environmental compliance, or (b) a documented, systematic
procedure reflecting the entity's due diligence in preventing, detecting, and
correcting violations."' Besides the fact that EPA's due diligence "laundry
list" is extensive, EPA makes clear the point that an entity who fails to meet just
one of the due diligence criteria will not be a candidate for penalty reduc-
tions."' Not only would companies have to spend valuable resources to
conform to the terms of the policy statement, but the risk of a non-conforming
audit is just too great. Accordingly, small and medium size businesses have little
incentive to investigate and to voluntarily disclose environmental violations.
In contrast, under H.B..2085, entities were largely free to structure their own
auditing programs according to the size and nature of their businesses without
fear of losing the privilege if their plan was not in exact conformity with a
standardized due diligence list. Though "due diligence" was mentioned in
Section 2517 of the bill, an entity needed only to pursue "compliance with due
diligence." ' 4 Due diligence was not required to be a part of the self-evalua-
tion that uncovered the violation in the first instance. Further, even if due
diligence was implicitly required for an effective environmental audit, H.B. 2085
contained no definition of "due diligence," thereby leaving the bounds of the
phrase potentially open-ended.
Other broadly defined phrases in H.B. 2085, like "environmental audit
report,.'.s "voluntary self-evaluation,"" 6 and "audit,"' 17 would also have
aided smaller entities in their auditing efforts and encouraged them to self-report.
The bill defined an "audit" as a "voluntary, internal, and comprehensive
112. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,708 (1995).
113. 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,710(B) (1995): 'Due Diligence' encompasses the regulated
entity's systematic efforts... to prevent, detect and correct violations through all of the following:"
See supra note 88 for the list that follows.
114. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2517(3) (emphasis added).
115. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2512(3).
116. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2512(7).
117. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2512(8).
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evaluation of a facility or an activity at a facility... designed to identify and
prevent noncompliance and improve compliance. . . .. " The only qualifica-
tion was that an audit could not be conducted by the owner of the facility, an
employee of the facility, or an independent contractor. " '
A "voluntary self evaluation" was defined as "a self-initiated audit, not
otherwise expressly required by environmental law, that is performed pursuant
to an audit plan approved in advance in writing by plant management... to
determine whether such person or entity is in compliance with applicable
environmental laws."' ° Besides the requirement that the plan be pre-approved,
the only other restriction on such evaluations is that they must be completed
within a reasonable time.' 2'
Finally, the bill defines an "environmental audit report" as "any document,
including any report, finding, communication, or opinion or any draft of a report,
finding, communication, or opinion, related to and prepared as the result of a
voluntary self-evaluation that is done in good faith pursuant to an audit plan
approved in advance in writing by plant management."'22
Of course the problem with extending the privilege to such an undefined
range of auditing activities is that the pendulum could swing too far away from
EPA's restrictive policy. While H.B. 2085 may have increased the number of
self-reported violations by giving entities wider latitude in their self-policing
activities, it may also have inhibited regulatory enforcement efforts at critical
moments and given safe harbor to "bad actors." A significant omission in H.B.
2085 was the bill's failure to give any regulatory agency, or anyone for that
matter, authority to approve or disapprove the manner in which an audit is
conducted. Many may wonder, for example, if H.B. 2085 would allow an entity
to claim the privilege for any document simply by labelling it an environmental
audit report.
E. Enforcement Efforts Not Thwarted by H.B. 2085
Opponents of audit privilege and immunity legislation fear that such laws
will shield bad actors from the reach of the law. Of paramount concern is that
such measures stifle environmental lawsuits and enforcement of environmental
laws. EPA administrator Carol Browner commented last year that EPA is
".extremely concerned' about state environmental audit laws and bills that would
shield companies from prosecution if they audit and voluntarily correct and
report criminal violations."'' Government prosecutors have also been very
vocal about their opposition to recent audit legislation.
118. Id.
119. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2512(8).
120. H.B. No. 2085. 1995 Session, § 2512(7).
121. Id.
122. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2512(3) (emphasis added).
123. Outside the Courtroom, Toxics L. Rep., Mar. 29, 1995, at 1176.
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In June of 1996, while two audit immunity and privilege bills were pending
in Congress, the' National District Attorneys Association sent a letter to a group
of conservative House Democrats asking them to abandon their efforts to pass
the bills.'" The district attorneys stressed the need for free access to audit
materials:
Because of the highly technical nature of many environmental offenses,
and because of the structured management levels found in most
corporations, the elements of knowledge and intent become paramount
in any decision by a prosecutor to bring criminal charges either against
the corporate entity or individuals within the corporation. Records of
the corporation would provide the information necessary to make this
determination."
Regarding immunity for violations, the prosecutors urged the Congressmen to
consider less "potent" protection such as penalty mitigation or the use of
corporate records as an affirmative defense. 26
Many proponents of audit laws, like attorney for the Corporate Environmen-
tal Enforcement Council (CEEC) Paul G. Wallach, think that prosecutors have
more than enough resources to prosecute environmental violations without having
access to audit reports. As Wallach says, "[t]hey [prosecutors] express concern
about anything that will limit their discretion.... But I found the more
experienced ones do not believe it [an audit privilege] is a big issue, because in
most cases they have such information-gathering authority, and they do not need
to get audit reports.'
2 7
Regardless of whether access to audit reports is a necessary weapon in the
prosecutorial arsenal, a statutory privilege modeled after H.B. 2085 should not
substantially inhibit the exercise of authority entrusted to law enforcement
officials and regulatory agencies. Even though the bill's definition of an audit
report clearly intended to embrace a broad range of activities, the explicit list of
unprotected materials and the enumeration of circumstances under which the
privilege would be lost highlight the fact that Louisiana's audit privilege would
not provide blanket protection to regulated entities.'28
While entities would have a substantial amount of leeway in fashioning their
audits, they would have little freedom in how they would respond to discovered
violations. Specifically, if a court or administrative law judge determined that
an entity has not initiated "appropriate efforts to achieve compliance" within a
124. General Policy: District Attorneys Urge Democrats To Reject Audit Ptivilege, Immunity,
27 Envtl. Rep. 465 (1996).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Rubenstein, supra note 9.
128. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2514 (Exceptions); H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513
(Application of privilege to environmental audit reports)
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reasonable amount of time after discovery of the violation," 9 that an entity has
fraudulently asserted the privilege, 130 or that an audit report demonstrates a
"significant danger to public health or the environment,"' 3' the privilege would
not apply. Since phrases like "appropriate effort,'"32 "reasonable amount of
time,"' 3 and "significant danger""' were left undefined, H.B. 2085 afforded
the judiciary much discretion in determining the applicability of the audit
privilege. Enforcement officials would thus have an opportunity to make their
case for access to an audit report.
Most important for enforcement officials to note is Section 2513(B) of the
bill. Under that section, if "any party" has independent knowledge that "good
cause exists" that the privilege does not apply or that an exception to the
privilege is applicable, a court or administrative law judge "shall allow" that
party access to all or part of an audit report for purposes of an in camera
review.13 Even-if an audit is privileged, H.B. 2085 still permitted officials to
obtain much information through external sources. For example, the testimony
of a person who participated in the audit and actually observed or had indepen-
dent knowledge of physical events relative to the violation was specifically
excluded from the privilege.'36 In that case, even without an audit report, the
enforcement authority would be able to procure competent and credible evidence
that a violation had occurred. While an audit report could certainly corroborate
a witness's testimony with subjective comments and analysis, some give and take
is necessary if Louisiana truly wants to encourage self-policing.
F. Should H.B. 2085 Apply In a Criminal Proceeding?
What may be the most contentious issue on reconsideration of H.B. 2085 is
the fact that the privilege and immunity provisions of the bill were not applicable
in a criminal setting. Many audit laws, like the one in Texas, provide for limited
immunity from administrative, civil, and criminal penalties where a voluntary
disclosure of an environmental violation is made. 3 ' On the other hand, the
last sentence of H.B. 2085 specifically stated: "None of the privileges and
immunities created in this Chapter shall be construed to apply in any criminal
investigation or proceeding."' 38
129. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513(A)(2)(b).
130. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513(AX3).
131. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513(A)(4).
132. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513(A)(2)(b).
133. Id.
134. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513(AX4).
135. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513(BXI).
136. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2514(7).
137. Texas Environmental, Health, and Safety Audit Privilige Act, 74th Leg., ch. 219, 1995 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv, !963.
138. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2517(L).
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Under the bill as written, the only consolation entities may have had with
respect to criminal proceedings was that a criminal proceeding could not be
"invoked or threatened as a means to compel the disclosure of an environmental
audit report for use in civil legal actions or administrative proceedings."'
Otherwise, H.B. 2085 provided entities zero assurance of amnesty from criminal
prosecution. Even under EPA's final policy, a person or entity demonstrating
due diligence has EPA's "assurance" (as non-binding as that may be) that EPA
will not hand the person or entity over to DOJ or recommend them for
prosecution.
Upon reconsideration, H.B. 2085 should be modified in a way that makes
regulated entities feel more at ease about the risk of criminal liability, while at
the same time preserving prosecutorial authority. Specifically, Louisiana should
consider adopting Oregon's approach and provide that the state could only gain
access to an audit in a criminal setting if (1) there is a compelling need for the
evidence; (2) the evidence is otherwise unavailable; and (3) the substantial
equivalent is unavailable without incurring unreasonable cost and delay."
Though such language does leave a court substantial leeway in determining
whether an audit report should be handed over, inclusion of such a provision
may at least prompt more disclosures than the bill as previously written. Of
course, the problem with such a provision would be the possibility of undue
burden on enforcement authorities. Interestingly, however, both the Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality and the Oregon Department of Justice
supported the enactment of Oregon's audit law."' Whether or not Louisiana's
enforcement officials will be so receptive remains to be seen.
G. Glitches In the Immunity Provisions of H.B. 2085
Overall, H.B. 2085 worked a reasonable balance between encouraging self-
reporting and preserving regulatory authority; however, certain details of the
immunity provisions of H.B. 2085 should be re-examined before their inclusion
in a subsequent bill. One such provision, found in Section 2517(I), states in part:
In order to receive immunity under this Section, a facility conducting
an environmental audit under this Chapter must give notice to the
appropriate regulatory agency of the fact it is planning to commence the
audit .... The notice may provide notification of more than one
scheduled environmental audit at a time."'
While notification may not appear to place an onerous burden on regulated
entities, a notification requirement could hinder self-policing and self-reporting.
139. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2513(C).
140. Bergeson and Sandifer, supra note 29.
141. Id.
142. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 25170).
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If an entity perceives a potential environmental problem, the entity may view
notification as essentially putting up a "red flag" that it is not in compliance;
moreover, once that flag is raised, nothing in the language of the bill would
prohibit a regulatory agency from intervening with its own audit. The end result
equals loss of immunity for the entity because enforcement officials "got there
first." The fear of such an occurrence might lead an entity to believe it is in a
better position if it does not say or do anything, and instead, simply remedies the
perceived problem without the involvement of regulatory officials.
From an enforcement standpoint, the provision for notification also presents
some problems. While H.B. 2085 expressly provided for the contents of a
notice," '3 the method of notice was not described. Notably, the bill did not
specify how much advance notice was required to be given. Since written notice
was not mandated, presumably a regulated entity could call the appropriate
agency the day before, or even the day of the audit, and still receive immunity.
Also, the bill as written would allow for notification of more than one scheduled
audit at a time.'" How many audits were contemplated? Would one notice
be sufficient for all of the audits scheduled in one year? Two years? For the life
of the company? One can see how bad actors might abuse this lack of
specificity. If H.B. 2085's notice requirement is kept in place, some designated
time period should be identified within which all scheduled audits must be
conducted. Alternatively, the legislature could provide for an express limit on
the number of audits a notification could encompass.
Before inclusion in a future bill, the legislature should likewise reexamine
the implications of Section 2517(D) of H.B. 2085 on voluntary disclosures for
immunity purposes. That part reads:
If the disclosure relates to the person or entity's failure to satisfy a
reporting requirement under a specific permit condition or order, then
such person or entity shall not ... be immune from any liability
associated with such failure to report. However, any other violation of
the environmental law associated with the failure to report, except for
criminal violations, shall be subject to the voluntary disclosure
provisions set forth in this Section."'
Drafters of Texas' audit law, which contains a similar provision, acknowledge
that it seems counterintuitive to protect an entity that voluntarily discloses
violations which it is already required by law to report.'" However, those
legislators argue that such a provision is an incentive for companies, required to
143. "The notice shall specify the facility or portion of the facility to be audited, the anticipated
time the audit will begin, and the general scope of the audit." H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, §
2517(1).
144. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2517(1).
145. H.B. No. 2085, 1995 Session, § 2517(D) (emphasis added).
146. Senator .E. "Buster" Brown et al., Encouraging Compliance: The Texas Environmental,
Health, and Safety Act, 26 St. B. Tex. Envtl. L.J. 79 (1995).
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report nearly every violation of a permit or regulation, to conduct an audit, report
violations, and bring their facility into compliance." 7
On the other hand, many enforcement authorities insist that regulated entities
should be liable for any failure to comply with existing reporting requirements.
As one FBI official commented, the FBI prides itself in seeking jail time and
high fines for environmental offenders and "is not in the business of nurturing
private companies into compliance. " 'o While most enforcement and regulatory
officials may hesitate to be quite so blunt, many enforcement agencies are
accustomed to a command and control oriented approach to environmental
compliance. Since audit privilege legislation cuts directly at the heart of
traditional bureaucratic structures, enforcement officials cannot be expected to
welcome audit laws with open arms.
IV. CONCLUSION: ROAD TO NOWHERE?
What is Louisiana to do? Though a federal statutory audit privilege would
end the entire dilemma, supporters of audit bills in Congress have yet to break
down the federal resistance to an evidentiary privilege for audit reports, and the
prospects of doing so in the near future look dim. The Clinton administration
stands firmly behind the proposition that "[p]rosecution is essential to protecting
public health and the environment.""' Since that is the case, Louisiana could
simply back out of the "federal v. state showdown" and wait for further action
on the federal level; however, retreat is not the best solution. Louisiana must
take affirmative action.
Louisiana could choose to follow the lead of California, for example, by
adopting a Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) audit policy that
expands on EPA's final policy statement. Like EPA's policy, California's policy
(dubbed Cal/EPA) does not shield results of environmental audits from public
disclosure, and California retains full enforcement authority to severely punish
companies that intentionally violate environmental laws and regulations.'" For
reduction or elimination of penalties, CaVEPA requires that companies meet the
same nine conditions as EPA's policy; however, Cal/EPA goes further than
EPA's policy by providing up to an additional fifteen percent in penalty
reductions for investments in pollution prevention programs.'5 ' Further,
Cal/EPA expands "the federal policy's guidance involving the right to refer cases
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for criminal prosecution.""' 2 Most importantly, since EPA's policy gives little
guidance as to what programs qualify for penalty reductions, Cal/EPA attempts
to provide industry with greater certainty by offering a certification program.
Businesses that follow the procedures specified in that program receive assurance
that they will benefit from the provisions of the policy."53 For any state that
believes EPA's policy stops short of meaningful incentives, but is firmly opposed
to a statutory audit privilege, Cal/EPA may provide a solution to the audit
debate. In Louisiana, however, Cal/EPA will still fall short of appeasing
Louisiana industry.
Considering the huge margin of passage that H.B. 2085 received in the
Louisiana House of Representatives in the 1995 legislative session, audit
privilege and immunity legislation will likely be Louisiana's solution to the audit
debate. The ultimate question then becomes which statutory model will be most
workable for encouraging self-policing and self-disclosure of environmental
violations. Unfortunately, at this early date little empirical data has come from
those states who have enacted audit privilege legislation, and the data that has
been compiled is lacking in detail and substance.
A year after the passage of Oregon's privilege law, one lawyer opined that
the law did not appear to encourage more companies to undertake audits, though
she admitted the privilege has definitely expanded awareness of audit programs
and has influenced how companies construct their audits.' Similar findings
came out of Colorado one year after its audit privilege and immunity law was
passed. In that year, an official from the Colorado State Department of Public
Health and Environment reported that only six companies voluntarily notified the
state of environmental violations.' Such a small number of disclosures, he
said, makes it difficult to judge whether the privilege legislation is "spurring
environmental self-assessment in Colorado."156
Findings in Texas are more promising. In August of 1996, Texas Natural
Resources Conservation Commission's (TNRCC) director of litigation, John Riley,
reported that 239 notices of intent to audit have been filed with TNRCC since
Texas' audit law took effect on May 23, 1995."' Entities filing those notices
include petroleum and chemical companies, universities, the U.S. Air Force, and
even some municipalities.' Thirty-five of the entities have made disclosures,
including record-keeping violations and exceeding state authorized permits." 9
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If Louisiana were to adopt an audit bill like H.B. 2085, the costs and
benefits of such a law may not be manifest until years after implementation. In
the interim, Louisiana will be faced with some significant implementation
problems. Federal preemption problems present the biggest obstacle to effective
implementation. As noted by drafters and supporters of Texas' audit law, unless
and until EPA changes its position with respect to privilege legislation, the effect
of a state audit bill will likely turn on the "location and nature of the ac-
tion." " ° If the suit is one in federal court under federal law, any privilege
established by Louisiana would not apply. If the suit is in state court under
Louisiana law, Louisiana privilege legislation would control. These two
scenarios and the applicable law are fairly obvious. Beyond that, confusion and
uncertainty ensue. If suit is brought in state court under federal law such as the
Clean Water Act, the privilege may or may not apply. If federal court is the
forum, but the action occurs under a delegated program and state law is used,
substantive state law should apply; however, the "federal courts' application of
substantive state law may differ from district court to district court."' 6'
Conceivably, then, a privilege law in Louisiana might offer little meaningful
protection for regulated entities, which ultimately translates into little incentives
for those entities to self-police.
Beyond preemption problems, many states that have enacted audit privilege
and immunity legislation are also now wrangling with EPA. While EPA has
always been opposed to a statutory audit privilege, the immunity provisions of
these state laws have caused EPA's most recent outcry. '62 In an April 5, 1996,
memorandum to regional EPA officials, EPA set out a new policy for determin-
ing whether audit laws take away state enforcement authority needed for certain
delegated programs, specifically Title V of the Clean Air Act."63 According
to EPA officials, EPA is concerned about how state laws and administrative
policies are affecting minimum enforcement standards in federal statutes.' 6
EPA maintains that it is not "crusading against these [audit privilege and
immunity] laws."'" However, since that memo, EPA has asked several states,
including Texas, to change their existing audit laws or risk losing delegated
authority to administer Clean Air Act programs.' 6" In light of these recent
developments, any state considering audit legislation must carefully structure its
laws so as to comply with minimum enforcement provisions of federal
environmental statutes.
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The road toward enactment of audit privilege and immunity legislation in
Louisiana will not be a smooth one. Amidst pressure from regulated entities,
regulatory and law enforcement officials, and EPA itself, legislators in the 1997
regular session will be faced with the unenviable task of drafting an audit bill
that can never appease all sides involved. While the comments and recommen-
dations of this author will not resolve the ongoing audit debate, this article may
be helpful in reaching an acceptable equilibrium.
Anna Kathryne Campbell
